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Abstract 
 
 
 
Using a comprehensive sample of cross-country mergers and acquisitions for the period 2000 to 
2014 we examine the effect of common auditors on the efficiency of cross-country M&A 
transactions. We predict that the use of common auditors reduces uncertainty, resulting in higher 
M&A efficiency. We find that this common-auditor effect results in a positive market reaction to 
the M&A announcement, lower premium and greater increase in return on assets following the 
M&A transaction. Further, we find that these effects are more pronounced the greater the M&A 
transaction uncertainty and when the accounting standards of the transacting parties differ.  
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1. Introduction 
Cross-country M&A transactions arguably create more information asymmetry than within 
country M&A transactions. This occurs not only due to the geographic distance between parties 
but also as the parties to the transaction are operating in different cultural, legal and economic 
environments (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). For both within-country and cross-country M&A’s, a 
significant amount of information is required to mitigate traditional financial risk and determine 
return optimization. Such information consists of codified or explicit information such as balance 
sheets or performance records, and more tacit information that is context dependent and personal 
(Polanyi, 1966; Arrow 1962; and Von Hippel 1994). In comparison to codified information, tacit 
information is harder to formalize and transmit over distance, necessitating more interpersonal 
interaction among parties; somewhat of a challenge for parties to cross country M&As. The 
codified information however is easily transmittable using a standardized formal and more 
empirical method.  
In this study we seek to determine whether the transfer of codified information through the 
use of a common audit network for cross-country M&As could result in more efficient 
transactions. We do this by referring to the suggestion in the existing literature that common 
auditors to the target and acquirer firms can reduce uncertainty and mitigate the negative effects 
of information asymmetry in within-country M&A transactions (Cai at al., 2016). Whether 
common auditors are important in cross-country M&A transactions has, to our knowledge, never 
been studied.  
In cross-country M&A transactions, the dispersion of auditors, caused by the same 
geographical, language and cultural barriers faced by the transacting parties, makes it more 
difficult for auditors to act as information intermediaries. Due to differing cultural norms and 
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potential language barriers, even when the parties to the transaction are audited by similarly 
qualified auditors, it is likely that such audit firms operate independently of each other due to 
differing accounting standards, thus not only effectively sharing limited amounts of information 
but potentially increasing the already significant information asymmetry. It is therefore an 
empirical question if when the parties to the transaction are audited by a common audit network, 
which hereof we refer to as common auditors, the common auditor effect documented by Cai et 
al. (2016) for within-country M&A transactions still applies.  
 To test whether common auditors are associated with higher quality cross-country M&A 
transactions we identify all completed cross-country M&A transactions, for the period 2000 to 
2014, in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the purchase and acquired 
full ownership of the target in the M&A transaction. As we need stock market data for some of 
our tests, we require both the acquirer and the target to be publicly traded. After eliminating deals 
with missing data our final sample consists of 351 deals, where 62 are common auditor deals and 
289 are non-common auditor deals.  
Similar to prior studies (e.g. Asquith et al., 1983; Bradley et al., 1988; Cai and Sevilir, 
2012; Agrawal et al., 2013; Goodman et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2016) we use acquisition 
announcement returns as our main measure of M&A quality and expect common auditors to be 
associated with higher acquisition announcement returns. Subsequently, we test whether other 
proxies used in prior literature to capture M&A quality, give us similar results. Specifically, we 
test whether common auditors affect premium and change in return on assets. We expect the 
acquirer to pay a lower premium in high quality M&A transactions, and the use of common 
auditors to be associated with an increase in return on assets following the M&A deal. In line with 
our expectations, we find that common auditors are associated with higher acquisition 
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announcement returns, lower premium and a larger change in performance following the M&A 
transaction.  
Further, we test whether the common auditor effect is more pronounced in cross-country 
M&A transactions with greater uncertainty. The greater the uncertainty, the more likely that the 
parties will benefit from standardized information. Specifically, we test whether such effect is 
stronger when the target is smaller, operates in the high-tech industry and has higher growth. We 
also determine if the use of common auditors among transactions using different accounting 
standards to those of the acquirer will result in better deals. In line with our expectations, we find 
that the common auditor effect is in fact stronger when the M&A transactions present greater 
uncertainty and when the accounting standards of parties differ.  
Our cross-country analyses would not be complete without taking into account the 
differences in cultural values across deals. We find, after taking into account two separate cultural 
measures (the World Value Survey and the Hofstede Indices) that the use of common auditors 
results in better quality deals. Finally, we test for the potential common auditor effect on the 
acquirer and find that the use of common auditors creates value to the acquirer. 
Collectively these results point to the common auditor effect documented in Cai et al. 
(2016) holding also in cross-country M&A transactions, where even though the need for 
information intermediaries is higher, there is less opportunity for information transfer. In 
interpreting these results caution should be exercised in that the quantity of information exchanged 
between auditors is unobservable and thus we cannot directly speak to the type, amount, and the 
transfer mechanics of such information. We are also unable to observe when such transfer of 
information is carried out. The transfer of information between auditors can take place at any point 
during the M&A process. Early on in the M&A transaction, the transfer of information between 
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common auditors can facilitate the identification of a target. Subsequently, information sharing 
may facilitate the acquirer pricing of the target, structuring of the M&A deal and the valuation of 
synergies arising from the M&A transaction. Finally, common auditors may facilitate the 
integration of the target firm within the merged company. Our findings do suggest however that 
the use of common auditors in M&As may benefit parties as a result of better access to codified 
or explicit information such as balance sheets or performance records that are standardized, thus 
enabling parties to better mitigate financial risk and determine return optimization.  
Our study makes some important contributions. First, we add to prior literature examining 
the role of auditors in M&A transactions. Most prior literature has examined the role of auditors 
in M&A transactions separately. For example, Xie et al. (2013) find that targets audited by Big 4 
firms are more likely to be acquired, while Golubov et al. (2012) find that targets with Big 4 firms 
have higher synergy and acquirer announcement returns. Recently, two studies have analyzed the 
effect of common auditors in within-country M&A transactions. Dhaliwal et al. (2016, p.1) find 
that common auditors are found in nearly a quarter of the deals and that targets are more likely to 
receive a bid from a firm having the same auditor. Moreover, they find that shared auditors “are 
associated with significantly lower deal premiums, lower target event returns, higher event returns 
and higher deal completion rates”. In a similar vein, Cai et al. (2016) find that shared auditors act 
as information intermediaries and give rise to higher quality M&A transactions. We add to this 
within-country literature by showing that common auditors also play an economically significant 
role in cross-country audits, when significant barriers to the transfer of both tacit and codified 
information between target and acquirer auditors exist. 
Second, we add to the literature examining the effect of sharing a common agent on 
economic outcomes. Particularly related to our study, Agrawal et al. (2013) studies the role of 
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common investment banks in M&A transactions and shows that acquirers benefit more than targets 
from such transactions. Similarly, Cai and Sevilir (2012) find that board connections between the 
target and the acquirer favor the acquirer and that such benefit depends on the type of board 
connection. Related to this literature are Dhaliwal et al. (2016) and Cai et al. (2016), which as 
discussed previously show that common auditors have an economically significant effect on M&A 
transactions. A common trait of these studies is that all relate to within-country M&A transactions. 
We add to this literature by exploring the effect of common auditors in cross-country M&A 
transactions, where language, legal, and cultural norms will differ. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss prior literature related to M&As, 
with particular emphasis on literature which studies the role of common auditors on M&A 
transactions. Section 3 sets out the sample selection process and discusses the research design 
while Sections 4 and 5 discuss the main results and additional analyses respectively. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
An acquisition is one of the major investments a firm undertakes. When two firms come 
together synergies are created. Yet, the pre-M&A evaluation of synergies is often a non-trivial task 
that is largely based on publicly available information. Usually, the acquirer performs a due 
diligence investigation that enables it to estimate the intrinsic value of the target. The first part of 
this process is to gather publicly available information that allows the acquirer to set the basic 
assumptions behind the pricing negotiations and estimate potential synergies that will later on have 
an effect on the efficiency of the deal and its performance (Wangerin, 2016). The information 
provided has crucial implications on the valuation judgments and the process is called the 
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preliminary due diligence. Second, the acquirer signs the confidentiality agreement and starts the 
due diligence review. The confidentiality agreement grants the acquirer access to private 
information that might include management reports, financial forecasts, or information on planned 
investments. Both parties commit to negotiate the deal. Finally, the acquirer performs a 
transactional due diligence to verify the accuracy of the target’s financial information and can 
withdraw the offer or complete the deal (Bruner 2004, Skaife and Wangerin, 2013).  
As evident from above, the information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target 
firms in an M&A transaction represents a high degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty is even 
greater in cross-country M&A transactions where uncertainties relating to the valuation of the 
target and the potential synergies arising from the transaction are compounded by differences in 
the cultural, legal and financial environments under which the two companies operate. Prior 
research indicates that such uncertainty negatively effects M&A quality, as evident from lower 
acquirer announcement returns and post-acquisition performance (McNichols and Stubben, 2015; 
Erickson et al., 2012). Moreover, Martin and Shalev (2016) find that more firm specific target 
information alleviates uncertainty and improves acquirer announcement returns and the expected 
value of the synergies arising from the M&A transaction.  
In complex deals or where the acquirer lacks prior M&A experience, investment bankers 
are usually appointed (Servaes and Zenner, 1996) to alleviate M&A uncertainty by providing 
acquirers with advise on target valuation, deal price and structure (Goodman et al., 2014). In a 
similar vein and more related to our study, Agrawal et al. (2013) and Cai and Sevilir (2012) show 
that shared investment advisors and interlocked directors significantly influence M&A quality by 
reducing information asymmetry in the M&A transaction. In a recent study Cai et al. (2016) find 
that the use of common auditors reduces this information asymmetry between the acquirer and the 
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target, ultimately resulting in higher quality M&A transactions. Moreover, in a concurrent study 
Dhaliwal et al. (2016) finds that the benefits of this common audit effect accrue to the acquirer at 
the expense of the target. 
 A common research design choice of the above studies analyzing the common auditor 
effect is that such effect is studied within U.S. M&A transactions. In our study we seek to extend 
this analysis to a cross-country setting. In such a setting even though there might be greater 
uncertainty in the M&A transaction and thus a greater need to share information, country specific 
differences between the target and the acquirer countries pose additional obstacles to the sharing 
of information between common auditors. Specifically, it is likely that direct discussions between 
common auditors about the M&A transaction, which Cai et al. (2016) identifies as the primary 
information channel through which information between common auditors is shared, is hampered 
by cultural, legal and language barriers. Given this, it is likely that in a cross-country setting, the 
channel through which information is shared between common auditors is through financial 
statement comparability. As discussed by Francis et al. (2014) and Blacconiere et al. (2011) each 
firm has a unique style of interpreting accounting rules, and thus it is likely that firms within the 
same audit firm network are better able to understand and interpret accounting rule choices.  
 As we mentioned earlier, the tacit information utilized to determine target valuation, deal 
price, and structure, in comparison to the arguably more codified financial statements, is harder to 
formalize and transmit over distance. We note however that the sharing of information in network 
audit firms is facilitated through developments in information technology (IT). IT structures such 
as the use of the intranet, database management systems and group support systems enables the 
efficient and effective capturing and sharing of information and knowledge throughout the 
networked firms (Banker et al., 2002; Winograd et al., 2000). Such systems do not only provide 
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network firms with access to third party expertise but also provide network firms with the ability 
to share audit team research, such as up-to-date interpretation of accounting rules, processes and 
working papers. Such an infrastructure enhances access to important, up-to-date material which 
should improve efficiency and reduce the information asymmetry inherent in M&A transactions. 
More importantly such systems “enable auditors to work in ‘virtual teams’ that are not bound by 
time and distance constraints” (Vera-Munoz et al., 2006 p.139). 
 In conclusion while it has been established that in a single country setting, the U.S., 
common auditors increase M&A quality (Cai et al., 2016), it is an empirical question as to whether 
such a common auditor effect holds in a cross-country setting where cultural, legal and language 
differences may hamper the transfer of information between common auditors. Therefore, in this 
study we seek to contribute to Cai et al. (2016 p.79) call for “future research to further examine 
the various aspects and consequences of a common auditor in M&A transactions”.  
 
3. Sample selection and research design 
3.1. Research design 
In this section we discuss the research design. Our main prediction is that cross-country deals 
where firms have the same auditor should improve M&A transaction quality. We therefore 
estimate the following model using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression: 
 
SYNERGY = α + SAME_AUDITOR + DEAL_CONTROLS +  TRG_CONTROLS +
 ACQ_CONTROLS + COUNRY_CONTROLS + FIXED_EFFECTS + 𝜀            (1) 
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where SYNERGY is the sum of the weighted 10-day acquirer and target cumulative abnormal return 
starting five days before and ending five days after the M&A announcement date, calculated using 
the adjusted return or market model. Our main independent variable is SAME_AUDITOR that is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer and the target share a common auditor, and zero 
otherwise. We also include several control variables commonly used in prior literature that proxy 
for deal, firm, and country characteristics. We also include year and industry fixed effects to 
control for any time trend and industry specific effects. Standard errors are clustered by year and 
industry. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
3.2.Sample selection 
We obtain a sample of cross-country mergers and acquisitions from Thomson Reuters 
Securities Data Company (SDC) database from 2000 to 2014. We start from year 2000 as the data 
on auditors is not complete prior to that year. The sample selection procedure for the analysis is as 
follows. First, we identify all completed cross-country transactions in which the acquirer owned 
less than 50% of the target prior to the purchase and acquired 100% of the target. In other words, 
similar to other studies we only include the transactions where there was an unequivocal change 
in control (Moeller et al., 2004; McNichols and Stubben, 2015). Subsequently, as we require stock 
price data for both parties to the transaction we drop deals where either the target or the acquirer 
is not a publicly traded firm. Finally, we collect information on the auditors of the sampled firms 
from Thomson Reuters, and accounting and market data from Worldscope and Datastream 
respectively.  
In table 1 we present the distribution of observations over the sample period. After 
eliminating deals with missing data we end with a final sample of 351 deals, where 62 are common 
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auditor deals and 289 are non-common auditor deals. The data are spread over the sample period 
with the highest frequency of deals in 2012 (13.39%).  
 
[Please insert table 1 here] 
 
In table 2 we present descriptive statistics for the full sample of cross-country deals (in 
column 1 and 2), deals with common auditor (in column 3 and 4), and deals with non-common 
auditor (in column 5 and 6). In the last two columns we present the difference in means and the t-
test for difference in means.  
First, we present the descriptive statistics for the M&A efficiency measure SYNERGY. Our 
main dependent variable is SYNERGY[-5;5] that is the  sum of the weighted 10 day acquirer and 
target cumulative abnormal return around the M&A announcement date, calculated using the 
adjusted return. We also, present results for different return window length i.e. SYNERGY [-10;10] 
and SYNERGY [-20;20] that are calculated using  sum of the weighted 20 and 40 day acquirer and 
target cumulative abnormal return around the M&A announcement date, respectively.  
In these univariate tests we find a positive difference in means between common-auditor 
and non-common auditor deals.1 This confirms our earlier expectations that the synergies are 
higher when the target and the acquirer share a common auditor. Second, we present descriptive 
statistics for control variables. We only find small differences between the control variable means 
for the two groups of M&A transactions. The differences between common auditor and non-
common auditor deals are only statistically significant for TRG_ASSETS, where we find that 
                                                          
1 This difference is statistically significant for the lengthiest time window. 
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common auditor deals have significantly larger targets, and TRG_MB, where we find that common 
auditor deals have targets with larger market-to-book values.  
 
[Please insert table 2 here] 
 
In table 3 we present correlations among our variables.2 SYNERGY is positively correlated 
with SAME_AUDITOR suggesting that common auditors do increase the efficiency of cross-
country M&As. We also find a significant positive correlation between SYNERGY and 
TRG_LEVERAGE, TRG_MB and ACQ_MB and a significant negative correlation between 
SYNERGY and ACQ_ASSETS. These results suggest that SYNERGY is correlated with the M&A 
transaction parties’ growth opportunities. In line with our results in table 2, we find a statistically 
significant positive correlation between SAME_AUDITOR and TRG_ASSETS. 
 
[Please insert table 3 here] 
 
4. Main Results 
4.1.Common auditors in cross-country deals and M&A synergies 
We show the main results for our base model in table 4 where the main dependent variable 
is SYNERGY. In Model 1 we present the results when we calculate synergies based on adjusted 
return. In Model 2 we present the results when we calculate synergies based on the market model. 
For the market model, we use 200 daily returns starting from 242 days before the announcement 
                                                          
2 In table 3 we do not show correlations with country characteristics to conserve space. These are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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date to 43 days before the announcement date, and we require at least 50 daily returns available 
for each firm. SYNERGY is estimated as the portfolio cumulative abnormal return from five days 
before to five days after the announcement date, where the portfolio is the market value weighted 
portfolio of both the acquirer and target firms. 
The effect of a common auditor on synergy is positive and significant irrespective of which 
method we use to calculate abnormal returns. We find that having common-auditors increases 
synergies based on adjusted returns by 1.8% and increases synergies based on the market model 
by 4.9%. Both results are statistically significant at 1% level of significance. The coefficients on 
the control variables are consistent with prior literature. For example, we observe that acquirer size 
is negatively associated with SYNERGY (Kimbrough and Louis, 2011; Golubov et al., 2012;Cai et 
al., 2016); highly stock financed deals give rise to lower syngergies (Louis, 2005; Cai et al., 2016); 
and that tender offers give rise to larger market returns (Golubov et al., 2012; Cai and Sevilir, 
2012). The magnitude of the coefficients for these variables suggest that synergies based on 
adjusted returns (market model) increase by 1% (1.8%) when stucturing an M&A deal as a tender 
increases; and decrese by 5.2% (7%) when the deal is financed by stock. Further, synergies based 
on adjusted returns (market model) decrease by 2.7% (3.3%) when there is a unit increase in 
ACQ_ASSETS. 
 
[Please insert table 4 here] 
 
4.2.Common auditors in cross-country deals and target characteristics 
In this subsection we examine the effect of common auditors on M&A synergies 
conditioned on certain target characteristics that proxy for information asymmetry, industry 
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complexity, and growth. We predict that in the presence of greater M&A information asymmetry 
we should observe a stronger relationship between common auditors and M&A efficiency. We 
assume that the smaller the target firm the less information is available on its operations and thus 
the harder it is for the acquirer to accurately measure the expected synergies. Thus, we expect that 
common auditors are particularly helpful when the transaction involves a small target firm. As we 
measure the target information asymmetry as the inverse of the target’s assets, we expect a positive 
coefficient on an interaction term between inverse of the target’s assets and the indicator variable 
for common auditors. In table 5 we present univariate and multivariate tests in columns 1 and 2, 
respectively. The significiant and positive coefficient on the interaction term, 
INV_TRG_ASSETS*SAME_AUDITOR, suggests that when targets are small the presence of 
common auditors is incrementally positively related to SYNERGY. 
 
[Please insert table 5 here] 
 
Subsequently, we expect that when a target operates in an industry that is highly 
technologically advanced the common auditor effect is greater. Following Loughran and Ritter 
(2004), we define the high-tech industry as an indicator variable equal to one if the target is from 
a high-tech industry, and zero otherwise.3 We focus on high-tech targets since such companies 
potentially pose greater uncertainty to the acquirer. Also, they might affect synergies and post-
acquisition performance due to the embedded complexity when integrating their operations with 
                                                          
3 According to Loughran and Ritter (2004) “Tech stocks are defined as those in SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 
3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 
3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 
3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), and 7371, 
7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software).” 
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those of the acquirer firm. In table 6 we present the results for the univariate and multivariate tests 
in columns 1 and 2 respectively. The presence of common auditors in deals involving high-tech 
targets generates significantly higher deal synergies when compared to non-common auditor deals 
involving high-tech targets, as evidenced by the significant and a positive coefficient on the 
interaction term. 
 
[Please insert table 6 here] 
 
Acquiring targets with growth potential is a common growth strategy and an important 
motivation for acquisitions (Levine, 2013). Yet, it is difficult to estimate the true growth potential 
of a target company. Common auditors likely facilitate the assessment of target growth potential 
and are possibly better able to help the acquirer exploit the targets’ growth opportunities. 
Therefore, we predict that common-auditors are particularly important when it comes to the 
acquisition of target firms with growth potential. In table 7 we report the results when we interact 
common-auditor with a proxy for targets growth potential i.e. market-to-book value. We find that 
the incremental effect is positive and significant at the 1% level. It suggests that in transactions 
where the target has growth potential the positive common auditor effect on synergy is 
significantly stronger. 
 
[Please insert table 7 here] 
 
4.3. Different accounting standards 
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Given the properties of our cross-country sample of M&As we can exploit differences in 
accounting standards between the target and the acquirer. We are interested if common auditors 
facilitate the information flow and affect merger synergies in M&A transactions where the target 
and acquirer have different (local) accounting standards.  
We hand collect the data on when the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
were introduced in each country in our sample.4 We define the variable DIFF_ACC_STD as an 
indicator variable that takes the value one if the acquirer and the target have different local 
accounting standards, and zero if both had adopted IFRS.  
We expect instances where the target and the acquirer use different accounting standards 
to result in greater difficulty for one party to understand the financial statements of the other party. 
This difficulty makes estimating the potential valuation and synergies from the deal more 
challenging. In this ambit, common auditors in their role as information intermediaries mitigate 
these challenges. In order to test this prediction, we interact the variable SAME_AUDITOR with 
DIFF_ACC_STD. We present the results of this analysis in table 8. We find that the interaction 
effect has a positive and significant effect, at the 5% level, on M&A synergies. This suggests that 
the presence of common auditors in M&A deals involving parties using different accounting 
standards is associated with higher M&A quality.  
 
[Please insert table 8 here] 
 
5. Further analyses 
                                                          
4 Data are publicly available at: www.ifrs.org. 
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While our primary measure of M&A efficiency is synergies, in section 5.1 and 5.2 we look 
at other measures of M&A deal efficiency that have been used in prior studies (e.g. Dhaliwal et 
al., 2016), specifically deal premium and deal performance. Finally, in section 5.3 we test whether 
our main results hold when we control for cultural differences between the acquirer and target 
firms; while in section 5.4 we test for the common auditor effect of acquirer abnormal returns.   
5.1.Common auditors in cross-country deals and deal premium  
In this subsection we examine the effect of common auditors on deal premium in cross-
country transactions. We estimate the following model: 
 
PREMIUM =∝ +SAME_AUDITOR + DEAL_CONTROLS +  TRG_CONTROLS +
 ACQ_CONTROLS + COUNRY_CONTROLS + FIXED_EFFECTS + 𝜀            (2) 
 
where PREMIUM is measured as the difference between the price offered in the bid and the target's 
trading price four weeks prior to the announcement. Given that Officer (2003) suggests the 
interpretation of large and negative premiums is difficult, we delete observations with premiums 
in excess of 150% or less than 0%.  
In line with the previously discussed findings, the results shown in table 9 indicate a 
positive common auditor effect on M&A deals. Specifically, we find that the effect of same auditor 
on deal premium is negative and significant, as evidenced by the negative coefficient on 
SAME_AUDITOR.. This result suggests that acquirers are less likely to overpay in M&A deals 
involving common auditors. The results for the control results are similar to prior analyses. 
 
[Please insert table 9 here] 
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5.2. Common auditors in cross-country deals and deal performance 
In this subsection we examine in a cross-country setting the effect of common auditors on 
deal performance proxied by an accounting based measure. We estimate the following model: 
 
CHG_ROA =∝ +SAME_AUDITOR + DEAL_CONTROLS +  TRG_CONTROLS +
 ACQ_CONTROLS + COUNRY_CONTROLS + FIXED_EFFECTS + 𝜀            (3) 
 
where CHG_ROA is defined as the difference between the one-year average ROA of the combined 
firm after the acquisition and one-year weighted-average ROA of the acquirer and the target before 
the acquisition. ROA is measured as operating income before depreciation at year t scaled by 
average of year t and year t-1 total assets.  
In table 10 we present the results for Eq.3. We show that the effect of same auditor on the 
change in return on assets is positive and significant at the 1% level of significance. This result 
suggests that having common auditors in cross-country M&A deals increase the change in ROA 
by 13% when compared to non-common auditor deals. Further, we find that a one unit increase 
(decrease) in ACQ_ASSETS (TRG_ASSETS) increase CHG_ROA by 6.9% (4.3%) respectively. 
 
[Please insert table 10 here] 
 
5.3.Common auditors in cross-country deals and cultural differences 
To ensure that our results are not driven by cultural differences/similarity between the 
countries in which the parties to the transaction are based, in this subsection we study the effect of 
18 
 
common auditors when controlling for cultural differences. Given that there is no single measure 
of ‘cultural’ similarities/differences we first proxy such differences using data from the World 
Value Survey as used by Ahern et al. (2015), and secondly we use the commonly used Hofsted 
cultural indices (Datta and Puia, 2015; and Hain et al., 2015). For this analyses, we use synergy 
based on adjusted returns, SYNERGY [-5;5] as our dependent variable. 
We present the results for this analysis in table 11. First, in Model 1 we control for the 
logarithmic transformation of the absolute differences between the parties to the M&A transactions 
in two cultural values that are taken from World Values Survey (WVS): 1) TRUST where 
respondents in a particular country were asked to answer the following question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people?”; and 2) INDIVIDUALISM were respondents in a particular country were 
asked to answer the following question: “How would you place your views on this scale?”  
Second, in Model 2 of table 11 we include the logarithmic transformation of the absolute 
difference between the parties to the M&A transaction for several cultural values of Hofstede Index 
(Hofstede and Bond, 1984; and Hofsetde et al.. 2010) such as PDI (Power Distance Index), IDV 
(Individualism vs. Collectivism), MAS (Masculinity vs. Femininity), UAI (Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index), LTOWVS (Long-term Orientation vs. Short-term Orientation), and IVR (Indulgence vs. 
Restraint).  
In both analyses we find that our previously discussed results are robust to the inclusion of 
the additional controls. Specifically, the variable SAME_AUDITOR is still positive and significant 
at 1% level in both analyses. We also find that among the cultural dimensions analyzed, the Power 
Distance Index and Uncertainty Avoidance Index seem to play important roles in our analyses, 
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where a one-unit increase (decrease) in our measure of power distance (uncertainty avoidance) 
increases SYNERGY by 2.9% (1.9%).  
 
[Please insert table 11 here] 
 
5.4.Common auditors in cross-country deals and acquirer value 
In table 12, we show the results of the regression analysis where we substitue SYNERGY 
with ACQ_CAR as our dependent variable. ACQ_CAR [-5;5] is the 10-day acquirer cumulative 
abnormal return around the M&A announcement date. The results in Model 1 show a significant 
and positive association between COMMON_AUDITOR and ACQ_CAR suggesting that the 
presence of common auditors increases cumulative abnormal acquirer returns around the M&A 
announcement date. The result is significant at the 1% level and suggests a postive common auditor 
effect of 2.1% on ACQ_CAR. In model 2, we control for acquirer overpayment (PREMIUM) and 
find that our inference hold albeit the relationship between COMMON_AUDITOR and ACQ_CAR 
is weaker.  
 
[Please insert table 12 here] 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we study whether the presence of common auditors in cross–country M&A 
transactions increases the quality of the deal. Cross-country M&A transactions present significant 
uncertainties to the parties of the transaction as the tacit information required to determine target 
valuation, deal price, and structure, is harder to formalize and transmit over distance. Also, as it is 
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common in such transactions that the acquirer and the target are operating within different legal 
systems, and are subject to differing cultural norms and languages, that whatever information that 
can be codified empirically may still give rise to information asymmetry between the parties due 
to differing interpretations. Such barriers make the acquirer’s assessment of the potential synergies 
arising from cross-country M&As significantly more difficult than in case of within-country 
M&As.   
Prior literature has found that nearly a quarter of U.S. M&A deals have shared auditors and 
that common auditors act as information intermediaries, thus mitigating uncertainty in M&A 
transactions resulting in higher quality M&A deals (eg. Cai et al., 2016 and Dhaliwal et al., 2016). 
Prior studies analyzing the common auditor effect have however focused on within country deals. 
In this study we seek to address the Cai et al. (2016) call for further research analyzing the effect 
of common auditors on M&A transactions.  
Given the higher uncertainty of cross-country M&A transactions, the need for information 
intermediaries is greater. However, differences in cultural and legal norms may pose significant 
barriers to the sharing of information between common auditors. Thus ex-ante it is unclear whether 
the common audit effect documented in prior literature may be extended to cross-country M&A 
transactions. 
We find that the use of common auditors give rise to higher quality M&A transactions, as 
proxied by higher synergy around the M&A announcement date, lower premium and a larger 
change in acquirer return on assets post-acquisitions. Moreover, we find that such common auditor 
effect is even greater for cross-country M&A deals, which pose additional uncertainty. Such deals 
include M&A transactions where the target is small, coming from the high-tech industry, and has 
growth potential. We also find that the common auditor effect is stronger when the parties operate 
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within jurisdictions with different accounting standards. Our cross-country analyses take two 
separate cultural measures, the World Value Survey and the Hofstede Indices, and we find that 
controlling for cultural differences, the use common auditors results in better quality deals. Finally, 
we compare our results by taking into consideration the potential benefit to only the acquirer and 
find that the use of common auditors creates value to the acquirer. Taken together these results 
suggest that the common auditor effect documented in prior literature for within-country M&A 
transactions extends to cross-country M&A transactions.  
We note however that in interpreting these results caution should be exercised in that the 
quantity of information between auditors is unobservable and thus we cannot directly speak to the 
type, amount and the transfer mechanics of such information. We are also unable to observe when 
such transfer of information is carried out. Our findings do suggest however that the use of 
common auditors in M&As may benefit parties as a result of better access to codified or explicit 
information such as balance sheets or performance records that are standardized and interpreted 
correspondingly among parties, thus enabling parties to better mitigate financial risk and determine 
return optimization.  
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Appendix 1. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name Description [Source] 
Dependent Variables  
CHG_ROA Change in return on assets (ROA). Measured as the difference between 1-year average 
ROA of the combined firm after the acquisition and 1-year weighted-average ROA of the 
acquirer and the target before the acquisition. ROA is measured as operating income 
before depreciation at year t scaled by average of year t and year t-1 total assets [Thomson 
Reuters] 
SYNERGY The sum of the weighted 10-day acquirer and target cumulative abnormal return around 
the M&A announcement date, calculated using the adjusted return [Thomson Reuters, 
Thomson One SDC] 
PREMIUM The difference between the price offered in the bid and the target's trading price four 
weeks’ prior [Thomson Reuters, Thomson One SDC] 
Main Independent 
Variables 
 
SAME_AUDITOR An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer and the target share common auditor, 
and zero otherwise. [Thomson Reuters]  
Acquirer Characteristics  
ACQ_ASSETS 
 
Acquirer’s size. Measured as the natural logarithm of acquirer's market value at the end 
of the quarter prior to the announcement [Thomson Reuters] 
ACQ_ROA  
 
Acquirer’s return on assets for the year ended before the announcement year, measured 
as operating income before depreciation scaled by average total assets [Thomson Reuters] 
ACQ_LEV  
 
Acquirer's pre-acquisition leverage. Measured as the sum of long term debt and short term 
debt deflated by total assets at the fiscal year end prior to an acquisition announcement 
[Thomson Reuters] 
ACQ_MB Acquirer's market-to-book. Measured as shares outstanding times stock price divided by 
the total equity at the fiscal year end prior to an acquisition announcement [Thomson 
Reuters] 
Target Characteristics  
TRG_ASSETS  
 
Target's size. Measured as the natural logarithm of acquirer's market value at the end of 
the quarter prior to the announcement [Thomson Reuters] 
TRG_ROA  
 
Target’s return on assets for the year ended before the announcement year, measured as 
operating income before depreciation scaled by average total assets [Thomson Reuters] 
TRG_LEV  
 
Target's pre-acquisition leverage. Measured as the sum of long term debt and short term 
debt deflated by total assets at the fiscal year end prior to an acquisition announcement  
[Thomson Reuters] 
TRG_MB 
Target's market-to-book. Measured as shares outstanding times stock price divided by the 
total equity at the fiscal year end prior to an acquisition announcement  [Thomson Reuters] 
Deal Characteristics  
SAME_INDUSTRY An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the acquirer and the target are in the same 
industries, and zero otherwise [Thomson One SDC] 
TOEHOLD Acquirer's percentage equity ownership in the target firm prior to the deal announcement 
[Thomson One SDC] 
TENDER An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the acquisition is classified as tender offer, 
and zero otherwise [Thomson One SDC] 
TARGET_FEE An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the target has a termination fee, and zero 
otherwise [Thomson One SDC] 
CASH An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the acquisition was financed at least 90 
percent by cash, and zero otherwise [Thomson One SDC] 
STOCK An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the acquisition was financed at least 90 
percent by acquirer's stocks, and zero otherwise [Thomson One SDC] 
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TRG_HIGHTECH An indicator variable equals one if the acquirer and the target are both from the high-
tech industries as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004) and zero otherwise. [Thomson 
One SDC] 
RELATIVE Relative deal size. Measured as the ratio of the transaction value to the market value of 
the bidder [Thomson One SDC, CRSP]  
DIFF_ACC_STD An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if acquirer and the target have different 
accounting standards, and zero otherwise [www.ifrs.org] 
Country Characteristics  
LEGOR_UK_ACQ An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer firm is from a Common Law region, and 
zero otherwise [LLSV, 2001] 
LEGOR_UK_TRG An indicator variable equal to one if the target firm is from a Common Law region, and 
zero otherwise [LLSV, 2001] 
CREDITOR_ACQ An index aggregating different creditor rights of the acquirer firm’s country from La Porta 
et al. (1998). The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country imposes restrictions, 
such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured 
creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has 
been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution 
of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) 
the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization   
CREDITOR_TRG 
An index aggregating different creditor rights of the target firm’s country from La Porta 
et al. (1998) 
GDPPC_ACQ GDP per capital in the acquirer firm’s country [World Bank] 
GDPPC_TRG GDP per capital in the target firm’s country [World Bank] 
Cultural Differences 
TRUST Average answer to the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that (1) 
Most people can be trusted (2) Need to be very careful” (Question V25) [Source: World 
Values Survey] 
INDIVIDUALISM Average answer to the following question: “Incomes should be more equal or We need 
larger income differences as incentives for individual effort” (Question V141) [Source: 
World Values Survey] 
PDI 
Power Distance Index of the respective target and acquirer countries (see http://geert-
hofstede.com/national-culture.html) 
IDV 
Individualism versus Collectivism of the respective target and acquirer countries (see 
http://geerthofstede.com/national-culture.html) 
MAS 
Masculinity versus Femininity of the respective target and acquirer countries (see 
http://geerthofstede.com/national-culture.html) 
UAI 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the respective country target and acquirer countries (see 
http://geerthofstede.com/national-culture.html) 
LTOWVS Long -Term Orientation versus Short-Term Normative Orientation of the respective 
target and acquirer countries (see http://geert-hofstede.com/nationalculture.html) 
IVR Indulgence versus Restraint of the respective target and acquirer countries (see 
http://geert-hofstede.com/nationalculture.html) 
Note: All accounting variables are as of the latest fiscal year ending before the acquisition announcement date. 
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Table 1. Sample distribution 
 
This table shows the distribution of M&A transactions across the sample period. The sample 
includes all cross-country acquisitions announced between 2000 and 2014 in which the 
acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the purchase and acquired 100% of the 
target. 
 
 Full sample  
Common auditor 
deals  
Non-common auditor 
deals 
 Year Number Percentage   Number Percentage   Number Percentage 
2000 4 1.14  2 3.23  2 0.69 
2001 19 5.41  4 6.45  15 5.19 
2002 2 0.57  1 1.61  1 0.35 
2003 7 1.99  3 4.84  4 1.38 
2004 18 5.13  5 8.06  13 4.50 
2005 22 6.27  6 9.68  16 5.54 
2006 29 8.26  6 9.68  23 7.96 
2007 33 9.40  14 22.58  19 6.57 
2008 20 5.70  1 1.61  19 6.57 
2009 22 6.27  1 1.61  21 7.27 
2010 43 12.25  4 6.45  39 13.49 
2011 30 8.55  4 6.45  26 9.00 
2012 47 13.39  7 11.29  40 13.84 
2013 23 6.55  2 3.23  21 7.27 
2014 32 9.12  2 3.23  30 10.38 
Total 351 100  62 100  289 100 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
This table shows summary statistics for the variables used in our base model. The sample 
includes all cross-country mergers and acquisitions announced between 2000 and 2014 in 
which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the purchase and acquired 100% 
of the target. The sample size consists of 351 deals. 
 
  Full sample 
Common 
auditor deals 
Non-common 
auditor deals Difference 
in Mean 
 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD t-stat 
Announcement returns 
SYNERGY[-5;5] 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.18 0.03 0.09 0.02 -1.48 
SYNERGY[-10;10] 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.22 0.04 0.12 0.02 -1.02 
SYNERGY[-20;20] 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.26 0.04 0.15 0.05* -2.00 
Controls         
SAME_INDUSTRY 0.62 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.62 0.49 -0.01 0.15 
TOEHOLD 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30 0.03 -0.76 
TENDER 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.01 -0.20 
TARGET_FEE 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.50 -0.01 0.19 
CASH 0.55 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.57 0.50 -0.10 1.48 
STOCK 0.19 0.40 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.38 0.08 -1.41 
TRG_HIGHTECH 0.37 0.48 0.29 0.46 0.39 0.49 -0.10 1.44 
TRG_ASSETS 5.64 2.07 6.18 2.15 5.53 2.04 0.65** -2.24 
ACQ_ASSETS 8.06 2.36 8.31 2.08 8.00 2.42 0.31 -0.93 
TRG_ROA -0.04 0.22 -0.03 0.26 -0.04 0.21 0.01 -0.29 
ACQ_ROA 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.15 -0.00 -0.06 
TRG_LEVERAGE 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.02 -0.84 
ACQ_LEVERAGE 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.03 -1.58 
TRG_MB 2.43 2.88 3.06 4.09 2.29 2.54 0.77* -1.91 
ACQ_MB 2.57 2.80 2.73 3.37 2.53 2.66 0.20 -0.51 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
This table shows Pearson correlation for the variables used in our base model. N=351. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) SYNERGY 1.00                 
(2) SAME_AUDITOR 0.08 1.00                
(3) SAME_INDUSTRY -0.05 -0.01 1.00               
(4) TOEHOLD -0.03 0.04 0.09 1.00              
(5) TENDER -0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.13* 1.00             
(6) TARGET_FEE -0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.17* -0.16* 1.00            
(7) CASH 0.03 -0.08 -0.16* 0.02 0.21* 0.07 1.00           
(8) STOCK -0.08 0.08 0.23* 0.10 -0.20* -0.06 -0.54* 1.00          
(9) TRG_HIGHTECH 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.10 0.01 0.04 0.13* -0.09 1.00         
(10) TRG_ASSETS -0.05 0.12* -0.05 0.07 0.05 0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.17* 1.00        
(11) ACQ_ASSETS -0.21* 0.05 -0.10 0.03 0.16* 0.15* 0.23* -0.31* -0.07 0.67* 1.00       
(12) TRG_ROA -0.09 0.02 -0.12* -0.03 0.19* -0.01 0.21* -0.29* -0.15* 0.36* 0.32* 1.00      
(13) ACQ_ROA -0.04 0.00 -0.11* 0.04 0.12* -0.00 0.23* -0.27* -0.07 0.25* 0.44* 0.25* 1.00     
(14) TRG_LEVERAGE 0.14* 0.05 -0.15* 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.11* -0.14* 0.32* 0.14* 0.05 0.09 1.00    
(15) ACQ_LEVERAGE 0.08 0.08 -0.10 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.08 -0.13* 0.13* 0.14* 0.06 -0.03 0.27* 1.00   
(16) TRG_MB 0.24* 0.10 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.03 -0.11* 0.11* 0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.15* -0.01 0.06 -0.03 1.00  
(17) ACQ_MB 0.18* 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.10 0.11* -0.16* -0.31* -0.10 -0.18* -0.01 0.12* 0.17* 1.00 
 
Note: * p<0.05. The correlations with country characteristics are omitted. They are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 4. The effect of same auditor on M&A synergies 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable 
is SYNERGY[-5;5]. In Model 1 we present the results where we calculate the synergies based 
on adjusted return and in Model 2 we present the results where we calculate the synergies the 
Market Model. The sample consists of all completed mergers and acquisitions announced 
between 2000 and 2014 in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the 
purchase and acquired 100% of the target. All regressions include constant, year and industry 
dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and industry. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
SAME_AUDITOR 0.018*** (3.31) 0.049*** (2.79) 
SAME_INDUSTRY -0.001 (-0.10) 0.025*** (3.11) 
TOEHOLD -0.026*** (-18.08) -0.033*** (-5.90) 
TENDER 0.010*** (3.97) 0.018* (1.74) 
TARGET_FEE -0.005 (-0.24) 0.009 (0.48) 
CASH 0.018 (0.81) 0.034 (1.53) 
STOCK -0.052** (-2.26) -0.070** (-2.23) 
TRG_HIGHTECH -0.005 (-0.37) -0.005 (-0.28) 
TRG_ASSETS 0.013** (2.58) 0.020*** (4.31) 
ACQ_ASSETS -0.027*** (-4.49) -0.033*** (-12.73) 
TRG_ROA -0.025 (-0.41) -0.030 (-0.32) 
ACQ_ROA 0.063 (1.65) 0.106*** (3.91) 
TRG_LEVERAGE 0.026 (0.69) 0.041 (0.84) 
ACQ_LEVERAGE 0.054 (1.28) 0.028 (0.37) 
TRG_MB 0.010 (1.51) 0.012** (2.11) 
ACQ_MB 0.000 (0.08) -0.000 (-0.07) 
LEGOR_UK_ACQ -0.013** (-2.02) -0.026 (-1.65) 
LEGOR_UK_TRG 0.018 (0.68) 0.002 (0.06) 
CREDITOR_ACQ -0.002 (-0.37) 0.003 (0.31) 
CREDITOR_TRG -0.012 (-1.32) -0.009 (-1.29) 
GDPPC_ACQ 0.010*** (11.72) 0.015 (1.50) 
GDPPC_TRG -0.023*** (-3.03) -0.023*** (-3.02) 
OBSERVATIONS 351  242  
R-SQ 0.328  0.471  
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Table 5. Common auditor and target size 
 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable is 
SYNERGY [-5;5]. The sample consists of all completed mergers and acquisitions announced 
between 2000 and 2014 in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the 
purchase and acquired 100% of the target. INV_TRG_ASSETS is the inverse of 
TRG_ASSETS. All regressions include constant, year and industry dummies. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and industry. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
INV_TRG_ASSETS*SAME_AUDITOR 0.599 (1.31) 0.616* (1.69) 
SAME_AUDITOR -0.092 (-1.38) -0.097 (-1.50) 
INV_TRG_ASSETS  0.046 (1.27) -0.066 (-0.92) 
SAME_INDUSTRY   0.005 (0.52) 
TOEHOLD   -0.022** (-2.54) 
TENDER   0.003 (0.71) 
TARGET_FEE   -0.003 (-0.16) 
CASH   0.004 (0.22) 
STOCK   -0.053** (-2.63) 
TRG_HIGHTECH   -0.012 (-1.00) 
ACQ_ASSETS   -0.020*** (-4.99) 
TRG_ROA   0.023 (0.56) 
ACQ_ROA   0.081** (2.20) 
TRG_LEVERAGE   0.061 (1.29) 
ACQ_LEVERAGE   0.028 (0.50) 
TRG_MB   0.008 (1.45) 
ACQ_MB   0.002 (0.37) 
LEGOR_UK_ACQ   -0.018*** (-5.99) 
LEGOR_UK_TRG   0.012 (0.52) 
CREDITOR_ACQ   -0.003 (-0.57) 
CREDITOR_TRG   -0.010 (-1.47) 
GDPPC_ACQ   0.009*** (3.28) 
GDPPC_TRG   -0.018*** (-3.15) 
OBSERVATIONS 351  351  
R-SQ 0.195  0.344  
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Table 6. Common auditor and target industry 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main dependent 
variable is SYNERGY [-5;5]. The sample consists of all completed mergers and acquisitions 
announced between 2000 and 2014 in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target 
prior to the purchase and acquired 100% of the target. All regressions include constant, year 
and industry dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and 
industry. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
TRG_HIGHTECH*SAME_AUDITOR 0.150* (1.89) 0.097* (1.90) 
SAME_AUDITOR -0.022*** (-2.90) -0.012 (-1.07) 
TRG_HIGHTECH -0.026*** (-2.70) -0.021 (-1.18) 
SAME_INDUSTRY   0.002 (0.20) 
TOEHOLD   -0.024*** (-3.81) 
TENDER   0.014*** (7.13) 
TARGET_FEE   -0.003 (-0.15) 
CASH   0.013 (0.62) 
STOCK   -0.051** (-2.25) 
TRG_ASSETS   0.013*** (2.67) 
ACQ_ASSETS   -0.025*** (-4.51) 
TRG_ROA   -0.025 (-0.46) 
ACQ_ROA   0.070** (2.11) 
TRG_LEVERAGE   0.027 (0.77) 
ACQ_LEVERAGE   0.049 (1.05) 
TRG_MB   0.009 (1.48) 
ACQ_MB   0.001 (0.10) 
LEGOR_UK_ACQ   -0.011* (-1.73) 
LEGOR_UK_TRG   0.019 (0.64) 
CREDITOR_ACQ   -0.002 (-0.37) 
CREDITOR_TRG   -0.012 (-1.32) 
GDPPC_ACQ   0.008 (1.07) 
GDPPC_TRG   -0.019*** (-2.66) 
OBSERVATIONS 351  351  
R-SQ 0.190  0.346  
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Table 7. Common auditor and target growth 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable 
is SYNERGY [-5;5]. The sample consists of all completed mergers and acquisitions announced 
between 2000 and 2014 in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the 
purchase and acquired 100% of the target. All regressions include constant, year and industry 
dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and industry. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
TRG_MB*SAME_AUDITOR 0.026*** (3.12) 0.025*** (4.41) 
SAME_AUDITOR -0.056* (-1.93) -0.052** (-2.60) 
TRG_MB -0.0003 (-0.16) 0.001 (0.58) 
SAME_INDUSTRY   0.009 (1.04) 
TOEHOLD   -0.034* (-1.84) 
TENDER   0.006 (0.70) 
TARGET_FEE   -0.006 (-0.29) 
CASH   0.024 (1.29) 
STOCK   -0.054** (-2.57) 
TRG_HIGHTECH   -0.009 (-0.78) 
TRG_ASSETS   0.013** (2.55) 
ACQ_ASSETS   -0.025*** (-4.74) 
TRG_ROA   -0.040 (-0.85) 
ACQ_ROA   0.073** (2.03) 
TRG_LEVERAGE   0.014 (0.31) 
ACQ_LEVERAGE   0.063* (1.81) 
ACQ_MB   -0.001 (-0.40) 
LEGOR_UK_ACQ   -0.017*** (-2.71) 
LEGOR_UK_TRG   0.015 (0.72) 
CREDITOR_ACQ   -0.001 (-0.13) 
CREDITOR_TRG   -0.011 (-1.51) 
GDPPC_ACQ   0.011*** (2.67) 
GDPPC_TRG   -0.021*** (-2.92) 
OBSERVATIONS 351  351  
R-SQ 0.271  0.395  
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Table 8. Different accounting standards 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable 
is SYNERGY [-5;5]. The sample consists of all completed mergers and acquisitions announced 
between 2000 and 2014 in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the 
purchase and acquired 100% of the target. All regressions include constant, year and industry 
dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and industry. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
DIFF_ACC_STD* 
SAME_AUDITOR 
0.104* (1.67) 0.085** (2.29) 
SAME_AUDITOR -0.026 (-1.13) -0.021 (-0.92) 
DIFF_ACC_STD 0.013 (0.74) 0.002 (0.10) 
SAME_INDUSTRY   -0.005 (-0.32) 
TOEHOLD   -0.029*** (-13.37) 
TENDER   0.007 (1.20) 
TARGET_FEE   -0.003 (-0.18) 
CASH   0.018 (0.86) 
STOCK   -0.050** (-2.11) 
TRG_HIGHTECH   -0.006 (-0.35) 
TRG_ASSETS   0.013** (2.46) 
ACQ_ASSETS   -0.026*** (-4.82) 
TRG_ROA   -0.022 (-0.37) 
ACQ_ROA   0.065* (1.74) 
TRG_LEVERAGE   0.019 (0.50) 
ACQ_LEVERAGE   0.062 (1.37) 
TRG_MB   0.009 (1.56) 
ACQ_MB   0.000 (0.09) 
LEGOR_UK_ACQ   -0.016** (-2.37) 
LEGOR_UK_TRG   0.008 (0.37) 
CREDITOR_ACQ   0.000 (0.05) 
CREDITOR_TRG   -0.009 (-1.16) 
GDPPC_ACQ   0.009 (0.06) 
GDPPC_TRG   -0.020** (-2.35) 
OBSERVATIONS 351  351  
R-SQ 0.181  0.347  
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Table 9. The effect of same auditor on M&A premium 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable 
is PREMIUM. The sample consists of all completed mergers and acquisitions announced 
between 2000 and 2014 in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the 
purchase and acquired 100% of the target. All regressions include constant, year and industry 
dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and industry. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
SAME_AUDITOR -11.294** (-2.50) -9.024* (-1.71) 
SAME_INDUSTRY   3.410* (1.90) 
TOEHOLD   -4.566 (-0.73) 
TENDER   9.904*** (7.18) 
TARGET_FEE   -4.537* (-1.70) 
CASH   -9.495 (-1.39) 
STOCK   -12.314*** (-5.80) 
TRG_HIGHTECH   4.320 (0.64) 
TRG_ASSETS   -2.837** (-2.39) 
ACQ_ASSETS   -2.079 (-1.31) 
TRG_ROA   -2.640 (-0.42) 
ACQ_ROA   17.525 (1.60) 
TRG_LEVERAGE   -3.561 (-0.26) 
ACQ_LEVERAGE   -3.374 (-0.25) 
TRG_MB   -0.347 (-0.39) 
ACQ_MB   0.444 (0.46) 
LEGOR_UK_ACQ   -1.275 (-0.41) 
LEGOR_UK_TRG   15.551*** (2.95) 
CREDITOR_ACQ   1.482 (0.88) 
CREDITOR_TRG   -1.392 (-1.00) 
GDPPC_ACQ   2.678 (0.82) 
GDPPC_TRG   -0.252 (-0.05) 
OBSERVATIONS 287  287  
R-SQ 0.064  0.138  
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Table 10. The effect of common auditor on M&A performance 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable 
is CHG_ROA. The sample consists of all completed mergers and acquisitions announced 
between 2000 and 2014 in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the 
purchase and acquired 100% of the target. All regressions include constant, year and industry 
dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and industry. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
SAME_AUDITOR 0.120*** (3.18) 0.130*** (3.73) 
SAME_INDUSTRY   0.043 (1.12) 
TOEHOLD   -0.074 (-0.96) 
TENDER   0.066 (1.30) 
TARGET_FEE   0.008 (0.14) 
CASH   0.031 (0.35) 
STOCK   0.201 (0.67) 
TRG_HIGHTECH   -0.078 (-0.91) 
TRG_ASSETS   -0.043*** (-2.85) 
ACQ_ASSETS   0.069*** (2.87) 
TRG_ROA   -0.299 (-1.23) 
ACQ_ROA   2.511*** (4.03) 
TRG_LEVERAGE   0.015 (0.13) 
ACQ_LEVERAGE   0.066 (0.17) 
TRG_MB   0.004 (0.34) 
ACQ_MB   0.023 (1.45) 
LEGOR_UK_ACQ   -0.004 (-0.13) 
LEGOR_UK_TRG   -0.105** (-2.12) 
CREDITOR_ACQ   0.001 (0.03) 
CREDITOR_TRG   -0.073*** (-3.99) 
GDPPC_ACQ   0.027*** (3.02) 
GDPPC_TRG   -0.073* (-1.71) 
OBSERVATIONS 349  349  
R-SQ 0.048  0.393  
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Table 11. Same auditor, synergies and cultural differences 
 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable is 
SYNERGY [-5;5]. The sample consists of all completed mergers and acquisitions announced 
between 2000 and 2014 in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the 
purchase and acquired 100% of the target. |∆| indicates the absolute difference between the 
acquirer and target nation variables. All regressions include constant, year and industry 
dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and industry. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
SAME_AUDITOR 0.036*** (2.83) 0.038*** (3.00) 
LN(1+|∆TRUST|) 0.166 (1.60)   
LN(1+|∆INDIVIDUALISM|) 0.010 (0.85)   
LN(1+|∆PDI|)   0.029** (2.50) 
LN(1+|∆IDV|)   0.001 (0.19) 
LN(1+|∆MAS|)   0.014 (1.20) 
LN(1+|∆UAI|)   -0.019*** (-3.29) 
LN(1+|∆LTOWVS|)   0.019 (1.43) 
LN(1+|∆IVR|)   -0.010 (-1.07) 
SAME_INDUSTRY -0.001 (-0.15) 0.006 (0.50) 
TOEHOLD -0.036 (-1.38) -0.047 (-1.40) 
TENDER 0.010 (1.43) 0.002 (0.37) 
TARGET_FEE -0.018 (-0.62) -0.011 (-0.38) 
CASH 0.038* (1.94) 0.044* (1.76) 
STOCK -0.070** (-2.27) -0.069** (-2.09) 
TRG_HIGHTECH -0.016** (-2.00) -0.019* (-1.96) 
TRG_ASSETS 0.018*** (3.63) 0.019*** (3.93) 
ACQ_ASSETS -0.030*** (-6.35) -0.032*** (-5.82) 
TRG_ROA 0.004 (0.05) -0.010 (-0.11) 
ACQ_ROA -0.033 (-0.50) -0.033 (-0.51) 
TRG_LEVERAGE 0.046 (0.75) 0.040 (0.69) 
ACQ_LEVERAGE 0.037 (0.47) 0.033 (0.60) 
TRG_MB 0.010* (1.88) 0.009 (1.59) 
ACQ_MB -0.002 (-0.39) -0.002 (-0.31) 
LEGOR_UK_ACQ -0.010 (-0.62) -0.008 (-0.32) 
LEGOR_UK_TRG 0.049 (1.17) 0.041 (0.91) 
CREDITOR_ACQ -0.009** (-2.18) -0.012*** (-4.31) 
CREDITOR_TRG -0.018*** (-3.59) -0.006 (-0.62) 
GDPPC_ACQ 0.012** (2.03) 0.021* (1.87) 
GDPPC_TRG 0.012 (0.45) 0.021 (0.57) 
OBSERVATIONS 259  255  
R-SQ 0.481  0.502  
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Table 12. Same auditor, acquirer returns and premium 
 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable is 
ACQ_CAR [-5;5]. The sample consists of all completed mergers and acquisitions announced 
between 2000 and 2014 in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target prior to the 
purchase and acquired 100% of the target. All regressions include constant, year and industry 
dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by year and industry. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
SAME_AUDITOR 0.021*** (6.08) 0.014* (1.78) 
PREMIUM   0.000 (0.66) 
SAME_INDUSTRY -0.003 (-0.45) 0.003 (0.86) 
TOEHOLD -0.024** (-2.14) -0.021 (-1.15) 
TENDER -0.007 (-0.63) -0.003 (-0.42) 
TARGET_FEE -0.008 (-0.75) -0.002 (-0.26) 
CASH 0.028 (1.44) 0.030* (1.81) 
STOCK -0.021 (-0.76) -0.034** (-2.14) 
TRG_HIGHTECH 0.005 (0.46) 0.002 (0.17) 
TRG_ASSETS -0.004 (-0.89) -0.003 (-0.59) 
ACQ_ASSETS -0.012** (-2.14) -0.007* (-1.99) 
TRG_ROA 0.028 (0.78) -0.024 (.) 
ACQ_ROA 0.122*** (2.92) 0.086** (2.02) 
TRG_LEVERAGE 0.062 (1.50) 0.046 (1.35) 
ACQ_LEVERAGE 0.087** (2.02) 0.067* (1.95) 
TRG_MB 0.007 (1.05) -0.000 (-0.12) 
ACQ_MB 0.003 (0.62) -0.003** (-2.17) 
LEGOR_UK_ACQ -0.020*** (-2.80) -0.016** (-2.02) 
LEGOR_UK_TRG 0.011 (.) -0.001 (-0.12) 
CREDITOR_ACQ -0.003 (-0.91) -0.001 (-0.34) 
CREDITOR_TRG -0.004 (-0.62) 0.002 (0.48) 
GDPPC_ACQ 0.008** (2.44) 0.009 (1.34) 
GDPPC_TRG -0.026** (-2.33) -0.009 (-0.72) 
OBSERVATIONS 351  316  
R-SQ 0.309  0.204  
 
